INTRODUCTION
In a survey of research on migration in Africa, Derek Byerlee suggests that it is likely that the private and social returns to migration diverge and he calls for research to determine the magnitude of this divergence (1, p.16), Our study is a partial response to this request. Data collected in a 196 8 survey (see Appendix) are used to measure the divergence of private from social costs of in-migration into Nairobi during the period 1964 to 1968. Such a limited study may arouse criticism from those who would wish a more balanced approach dealing with both costs and benefits. We would like to indicate at the outset that we are in no way implying that the costs outweigh the benefits of migration. ( We conclude with a discussion of policy issues which indicates ways of modifying the costs without jeopardizing the benefits.
URBAN IN-MIGRATION AND URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT
The general pattern of rural-urban income differentials in Kenya indicates a distinct monetary advantage for a typical rural resident who moves to a city or town and is successful In obtaining some form of employment. For the migrants in our sample the average ruralurban income differential was 117 shs. per month, 182 per cent above average rural income. If the migrant was fortunate enough to find regular employment in the urban center during the first year after migration, the average differential increased to 147 shs. per month, a 230 per cent increase. This potential Improvement in cash income was purchased at the price of a rural-to-urban move and the cost of subsistence in an urban setting while participating in a lottery, "the urban economy game" (6, p.3) .
Given the magnitude of rural-urban wage differentials, the urban centers attract more migrants than can be employed at the prevailing urban wage. Therefore, there are at least two major forces at work which are determining in-migration: first, the positive influence of a large rural-urban wage differential which may be countered to some extent by the second, the migrant's perception of his ability to acquire a job. According to Todaro, the migrants consider the economic gains to be made from the rural-urban income differential but they also take into consideration the probability of obtaining urban employment IDS/DP 181 -2 - (22, p. 5) . This probability varies directly with the urban rate of new employment creation and inversely with the ratio of urban job seekers to the number of existing urban job opportunities (Ibid. , p. 23). If real wages are increasing faster than unemployment, then the migrant's expected income may be the same or increase coincidentally with the rising numbers of unemployed. This may also occur when wages and job availability are increasing proportionately or the rate of job creation is faster than the increase in real wages. Therefore, at constant or rising urban real wages, the creation of one additional job in the urban sector results in more than one additional rural resident responding in the form of a rural to urban move.
The existence of a significant rural-urban income differential creates a state of disequilibrium in the economy and emergence of large numbers of migrants is a response to this.
Equilibrium is achieved and positive rural-urban migration checked when the level of urban unemployment leads to a marginal expected urban real income equal to the marginal rural real income. Thus this model is committed to an equilibrium situation in which significant levels of urban unemployment exist. The greater the differential between rural and urban wage levels, the larger the stock of urban unemployed needed to bring the rural-urban distribution of labour into equilibrium. As long as a rural-urban expected real income differential persists, the migrant can hope for a positive increase in his welfare as a result of migration. Society as a whole experiences the negative effects of high levels of urban unemployment.
THE DIVERGENCE OF PRIVATE FROM SOCIAL COSTS IN RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION
In practice, private costs cannot easily be distinguished from social costs. The approach here is first to estimate all those costs which the individual migrant incurs in his search for urban employment. 1 The costs to society of the rural-urban move include all of these private costs plus the costs associated with the urban unemployment caused by the inappropriate urban wage level relative to the rural income possibilities. In the sample, migrants into Nairobi were unemployed for an average of 3.5 months before obtaining their first job or before engaging 2 in self-employment.
In the second part of this section we estimate as
1.
Much of the empirical analysis in this section is taken from (3).
2.
A limitation of our survey is that we do not know how may men arrived in Nairobi between 1964 and 1968 but had left prior to the survey. The possible bias on our cost estimates of this limitation in the data is discussed later in the paper.
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-3 -many of the social costs as possible based on 3,5 months of unemployment.
Accurate measurement of the costs of migration would have required the use of socially optimal prices and wages, but for practical reasons measurement had to be based on observed average prices and wages. The first private cost to be considered is the income forgone by the migrant when he leaves his rural place of employment. This cost will be particularly significant to him before he acquires urban employment. In his decision-making process
the migrant compares what he will give up -rural expected real income, with what he hopes to gain -urban expected real income, perceived in terms of the prevailing real wage rate and the probability of obtaining employment. If the difference between the two is sufficiently large, he will decide to move.
Cash income in the rural areas was used as a measure of rural income forgone. In selecting the relevant value of cash income, we considered two factors. First, the length of unemployment after migration was related to the type of employment prior to migration.
Those migrants who were either part-time employed or unemployed before they came to Nairobi wated the greatest average length of time for employment (4.5 to 5 months). The group which experienced only slightly less difficulty in obtaining urban employment was individuals who had been students before migration. The unemployed school-leavers embodied 16
per cent of the total migrant sample while the previously part-time employed or unemployed who remained unemployed represented 3 per cent of the total migrant sample.
Second, there were differences among the migrants in the realized levels of rural income. The men with a maximum of primary education averaged 62 shs. per month while the men with some secondary 3 education averaged 70 shs.
The few who were wage-employed averaged 3.
All migrants who were students prior to migration were excluded in the calculation of these averages.
IDS/' DP 181 average farm income was 2.3 shs. per month.
Since these two factors had opposite effects, the length of unemployment is higher for the men with below-average rural income. For the average length of unemployment the figure 3.5 months was used and for the average rural income the figure 64 shs. per month was used.
Therefore, on average each migrant paid 224 shs. in the form of rural income forgone to participate in the urban employment lottery.
(2) Average Cost of the Move: The second private cost is the expense of the move itself and the cost of maintaining contact with the home area.
Costs involved include actual travel expenses plus the psychological cost of being removed from family and friends. If a migrant has the possibility of making contact with friends and relatives in the urban center, then the psychological strain of estrangement may be decreased.
We hypothesize that the greater the costs of the move, the larger the differential in expected income necessary to pull the migrant to the urban center. Other things equal, as the probability of obtaining urban employment declines, the people who are most distant in an economic and social sense are most likely to forgo a rural-to-urban move. has others on whose resources he can draw to cover this cost, the greater will be the capability to risk a period of unemployment in order to obtain desired urban employment. If this cost can be passed on to others, it ceases to be a private cost except in the sense of the discomfort of cramped living and the obligations which must be repaid 4 at some future date.
If the migrant cannot depend on either of these methods, he will need to resort to peri-legal activities such as beerbrewing or traditional services such as operating a sidewalk shoeshine stand or, as a last resort, engage in begging.
The additional cost of subsisting in Nairobi was not easy to estimate but we arrived at a figure To the extent that assistance comes from family members with an expectation of repayment or subsequent assistance to other family members, it remains basically a private cost involving a transfer of income in kind.
and pulses equals 23 shs. per month
We may safely assume that, although this constitutes a small fraction of the total food bill of the middle income earner, a man living at subsistence level in Nairobi would confine himself primarily to items such as these. The Central
Province Survey of Urban Consumption concluded that food per household member costs 32 shs. per month (11, p. 65). From these figures we suggest that for a man to survive in Nairobi he must spend between '5 and 20 shs. on food per month.
Additional cost for the unemployed is the cost of urban transit while job hunting, which .:-sts about 0.1 shs. per mile, and the cost of a newspaper, which is 0-5 shs. These two items will vary in arooun-, depending on the amount the migrant is able t o sperd-He might no r be able to afford either; however, we will estimate tba he will spend on them a minimum of 4 shs . per month The average cost of subsistence a::d job search to the migrant for 3.5 months of unemployment will be '«5 shs.
for shelter, 61 shs. for food and I 1 -shs. miscellaneous for a total, cost cf 11.0 shs. for a minimum standard of comfort.
Whether these costs remain to be handled by the migrant or whether the unemployed are looked after by family ard _ ids will determine whether these costs are private or borne by society-The migranrs claim that 88 per-cent did receive assistance in the form of food and housing from others. Thus we are talking about 12 per cent of the unemployed and how they support themselves. Some unemployed migrants were receiving money from relatives living outside of Nairobi;
however this amount was greatest in 196^ when they received on average 0.3 shs. per month. Some unemployed men claimed they obtained miscellaneous income from unspecified sources, the mean value of which was 13 shs.
per month. This explains how some of the unemployed suported themselves without the aid of family or friends.
Social Costs (_) Average Urban Production Forgone: The first of the socia. costs is the urban production forgone during the time of the move and while the migrant searches for employment in the urban area. The exact value of this production forgone cannot be determined because the magnitude of the urban in-migration will affect the urban marginal product of labour.
The maximum value of the production forgone by the typical migrant will be the current marginal product of the urban employed. The lower extreme, if large numbers migrate, will be the marginal product of the IDS/DP. l8l rural employed. In our estimate of production forgone we provide a range of values based on these two extremes. In any case, the value of the urban production forgone is net of the rural production forgone by the migrant (see (1) under Private Costs). The value of urban production forgone will be a function of the migrant's education and job experience and will vary directly with the degree of urban unemployment.
Fifty-six per cent of the migrants who experienced some unemployment had some primary education, 36 per cent had some secondary, and 8 per cent were without formal education. These figures are comparable to the distribution of the total sample of migrants (56, 33 and 11 per cent respectively). The average length of unemployment of the migrants in these education categories did not differ except for the migrants with no education, who waited an average of 5.5 months to obtain jobs. Of those who had qualifications other than a secondary certificate, few had any training which would enable them to work at skilled jobs. Of the 147 who were unemployed in Nairobi, two had trade training and were unemployed from 13 to 15 months and one had a teaching certificate. This is also similar to the total sample of migrants and as a result we may conclude that those who were unemployed did not have inferior vocational training when compared to the total migrant sample. Young men were predominant in the sample of unemployed but made up 46 per cent of the total sample. The average length of time each wage group waited for a first job also emphasizes the significance of the younger men in the ranks of the unemployed. They average 5.9 months of unemployment compared to 3.5 months for all migrants.
Since the education and training differences between the unemployed and the total sample were slight, we concluded that the cost to the economy of the unemployed is not reduced due to any supposed inferiority on their part. The average income of the employed in the first quarter after migration was 266 shs. per month (primary -155, secondary -382, no education -153). Therefore, for an average of 3.5 months of unemployment, the estimated maximum cost to the economy due to unused manpower is 707 shs. per rural-urban migration (931 minus the average rural income forgone of 224 shs.). As stated earlier, if large numbers migrate, the marginal product of the employed urban worker will decline so that the above estimate represents a maximum net value of urban production forgone. The lower limit is the marginal productivity for the rural employed. For the men with some primary education, the IDS/DP l8l -7 -average rural wage was 150 shs. per month. the overcrowding in amenity use will create employment as well as greater amenity availability. Therefore, migration will be induced by the increased probability of obtaining employment. Further, for a given rural-urban expected real income differential, one might also argue that differences in the urban versus the rural standard of living may enter as an Inducement to migrate. cost which the city facilities must bear whether or not it is the migrant or his relatives who pay for it. Unfortunately we are not able to determin a value for this cost. The subject was studied according to the housing categories in which the migrants were living (3, chap. III). Those districts with the greatest numbers and proportions of unemployed migrants were: medium cost, medium density housing; low cost, high density housing; and temporary housing.
were living with relatives who were earlier migrants to Nairobi. These migrants experienced short periods of unemployment before obtaining their first jobs (1-2 months). With relatively low density the use of government supplied facilities did not appear to be unduly heavy.
The major social cost which these migrants imply is the influence they have on their hosts. Continual demands being made on a family in this housing category may have a discouraging consequence for the wage earner.
5.
The wage premium for secondary education Is considered to be negligible in the rural areas.
The cost of providing urban amenities for the unemployed is a We hypothesize that these men returned because they could not obtain satisfactory employment in Nairobi or because they had above average rural income opportunities. In either case, the inclusion of these men would have increased the value of social costs. Finally, only actual unemployment was considered in the estimates. Since the value to society of the output of some of the men who resorted to employment or self-employment in the informal sector as a means of subsistence is likely to be less than their social cost while in Nairobi, they represent an increase in the social cost caused by the inappropriate urban wage.
Changes in Social and Private Costs
According to our migration model, the creation of one new job above the existing rate of job creation will attract more than one additional migrant. Therefore, even if average private and social costs of an unemployed migrant: remain constant, an increase in the rural-urban expected real income differential will cause increasing social costs for the economy in the form of a larger stock of urban unemployed.
Furthermore, for a given stock of urban unemployed, if the characteristics of these unemployed migrants change, then the social cost of this stock IDS/DP l8l -12 -of unemployed will change as well. As a result we formulate here a series of hypotheses on the likely changes in the costs of migration caused by an increase in the rural-urban expected real income differential (type "a"), and by a change in the characteristics of the unemployed migrants (type "b").
(a)
The cost of the marginal unemployed migrant in terms of rural income forgone will increase if the rural-urban income differential increases. Some migrants who previously would not migrate, due to insufficient rural-urban wage differential will, with an increased urban wage, find sufficient incentive to migrate. This implies that they have a higher rural income than the migrants who left previously. This higher rural income also increases the migrant's opportunity cost of making the move; so a similar effect to that stated above would be realized if this migrant perceives an improved probability of obtaining urban employment, even if the urban wage has remained constant.
2 (a) When the incentive to migrate increases, the migrant more distant from the urban center or with a less common cultural heritage will migrate and thus increase the private cost of migration. areas, the gap between rural and urban productivity will tend to increase as the level of education provided increases.
5 (a) An increase in social costs will result, from the heavier demands being made on existing urban facilities by increased numbers of migrants. Higher urban densities will increase the discomfort of all and will induce government efforts to provide more facilities.
(b) With an increase
In the level of education, expectations with reference to living conditions and amenity will increase. Therefore, over time the social cost of unemployment will increase. 6 (a) With higher-levels of unemployment, more people will experience the frustration of unemployment The marginal unemployed migrant will be more prone to join a group which has negative political implications because larger numbers of unemployed make .-ommunication easier and such a group more powerful and, therefore, more likely to survive.
(b)
A change in the composition of the unemployed over time will result in increased political and social unrest. The unemployed will now be better educated and will be less likely to blame themselves for their inability to find jobs but rather will blame government, trade unions and the business firms.
Since we lack a sufficient time span over which to observe any trend in costs, if Is not possible to quantify changes in private and social costs. It would appear though that the costs of migration are likely to increase in the immediate future. The Kenya government has made a strong commitment to promote rural development but rural-urban wage differentials are still increasing. Also, the government has placed great emphasis on increasing the levels of education of its rural population. As a result, the general level of educational achievement in the labour force h^s risen in Kenya and continues to do so Finally, with increased levels of income In the urban centers, more mairied men will be able to afford to bring +heir families with them, which increases the costs per migrant.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION CONTROL
For the purpose of this paper we take as given both the existence of an urban unemployment, problem and the need during the process of economic development for a transfer of labour resources IDS/DP. l8l The difficulty with these three proposed solutions is that they are designed to counter the symptoms, expressed in the form of mounting social costs, rather than the causes of the problem. Although Harris and
Todaro explicitly recognize the inappropriate urban wage as the cause of the problem, they assume it is legislatively determined and thus do not consider the determinants of the rural-urban wage differential.
The persistent rural-urban wage differential is a function of three major factors. First, the inherited colonial wage structure, the need to employ expatriates since Independence and the international mobility of some groups have served to ensure international levels of remuneration for some of the employees in the major urban centers. The presence of international companies in large numbers aggravates the situation. Second, government policies with reference to Import substitution, trade licensing and minimum wages have encouraged a choice of technology which results in a relatively small, high-productivity, highwage labour force in the major urban centers. Third, productivity in the rural areas has not increased at a sufficient rate to keep pace with the productivity increase of the employed in the urban areas. In some rural areas the population pressure on the land is too severe to enable the 6. Harris and Todaro demonstrate that the rural areas will suffer a net welfare loss from migration control policies if the price elasticity of demand for the rural output is less than one.
IDS /'DP l8l absorption of a rapidly growing labour force in production characterized 7
by rapid growth in labour productivity.' In other rural areas where out-migration has exceeded labour force growth, the remaining population has lacked the ability to adapt to an alternative, more productive set Census, the inflow of adult population into Nairobi was estimated to be 9 90,800.
If each of these men experienced 3.5 months of unemployment on arrival in Nairobi, then, on the basis of our average social cost per migrant the annual cost to the Kenya economy of this growth in the Nairobi labour force was in the approximate range of K£4-18 ,977 to K£682 ,297.
For 1964-these values represent from .13 to .21 per cent of Kenya's Gross Domestic Product. Therefore, a considerable reduction of social cost can be purchased with some expenditure in rural development.
The opportunity cost of creating a rural job which induces one unemployed 7. Evidence collected In several rural areas indicates that the parents who cannot provide land for their children have channelled the available investment funds into education as a means of enabling their children to seek employment in the towns and cities (17, 8) , 8 .
The elements of this inability in rural areas to adapt to changing land-labour ratios has been developed by Koo (14) .
9.
The estimate was based on the difference between the 1969 African male population (Census, Vol. II, Table 3 ) and the 1962 African male population (Census,Vol. I and II, p. 36). The difference was then multiplied by the proportion of total African male population, age 20 years and older, according to the 1969 Census (Vol.Ill, Table I ).
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-ITmigrant in Nairobi to return to bis home area is the value of the new output of that migrant since his output forgone in Nairobi is zero. This approach to the problem will reduce the social cost of migration without jeopardizing the benefits to be derived from rural-urban migration. the types of housing they live in; and the political attitudes they express.
*
A complete description of the Survey and methodology will be found in Henry Rempel, "Rural-to-Urban Labour Migration: An Interim Report," Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, Staff Paper No. 39, (August, 1968) .
